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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT V. VANCE, D. 0.

)
)

Appellant and Plaintiff,

)
)

v

.

CORRECTION SHEET

)
)

PAUL T. FORDHAM, Director of the
Department of Registration,
Department of Registration and the
Osteopathic Corrunittee,

)
)
)
)

Case No. 18176

)

Respondents and Defendants.

)

Counsel for Respondent, Stephen G. Schwendirnan, Assistant
Utah Attorney General, has had brought to his attention two
errors in his Brief before this Court
correct.

which he desires to

These corrections are:

1.

Corrected citation: State Board of Medical Examiners
v. Rogers, 387 So. 2d 937 (Fla., 1980).

2.

Page 14, line 3 should read:
practicing psychiatrist ... "

DATED this

" ... Dr. Greenwood, a

-,~~h~~---.?2:"'ctay of April, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is before the Supreme Court as a secondary
appeal of the revocation of the Appellant's license to practice medicine as an osteopathic physician and surgeon by the
Department of Registration.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT(S)
An administrative hearing was held before the Division
of Registration in January 1981.

After the hearing before

the Osteopathic Committee, the Division, on February 6, 1981,
revoked Appellant's license for conduct that was deemed unprofessional by the Committee.

That Decision was appealed to

the Third District Court of the State of Utah, and after-a
complete review of the transcript and evidence involved, the
District Court upheld the findings of the Osteopathic Committee and affirmed the revocation of Appellant's license.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request this Court to reject the arguments
raised by Appellant as being improper before this Court and
after review of all pertinent issues affirm the decision of
the Division of Registration as affirmed by the Appellate
(District) Court and immediately lift the stay entered by
this Court which has allowed

Appellant to continue practice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents reject Appellant's "statement of facts" as
anything but undisputed.

Appellant's facts are nothing more

than self-serving, self-laudatory statements which have
little to do, if anything, with the reasons for revocation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This matter was originally heard before the Osteopathic
Committee in January of 1981 (R-170).

Following that hearing and

on the recommendation of the Osteopathic Committee the Division
of Registration revoked Appellant's professional license to
practice medicine as an osteopathic physician and surgeon for
unprofessional con.duct.

(R-169)

This involved the diagno-

sis, treatment, and procedures used by Appellant.

Many for-

mer patients and expert witnesses testified relative to
Appellant's treatments and methods.

After much testimony and

deliberation, a unanimous recommendation of revocation was
made to the Division (R 170-2).

A temporary stay of the revocation

was ordered by the Third District Court
pending appeal (R-8).
1981.

(R 2-3)

Feb~~ary

19, 1981

Notice of appeal was filed February 9,

A temporary order of the Court modified Dr.

Vance's license allowing him to practice within "accepted
medical standards of an osteopathic physician and surgeon,"
pending appeal.
appeal.

In July of 1981 Appellant had not pursued.-the

On July 8, 1981 Appellant's former counsel having

withdrawn for pecuniary reasons (R-19), Respondent entered
a Notice to compel Appellant to Comply with the Rules of
Procedure concerning the appeal. (R-28-34)
During July, Respondent became aware that various sections of the Temporary Order were being violated.

An employ-

ee of Appellant was deposed and an Order to Show Cause of
Contempt was filed on the 26th day of August, 1981 (R-48).
The District Court after hearing three of the State's witnesses,
continued the hearing on the contempt in order to decide the merits
of the appeal before her swearing in to the Supreme Court,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
2 administered by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act,
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leaving insufficient time, otherwise.
pending.

Those charges are still

Thereafter, Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was filed

(R-79, 81) and decided (R-127).

Briefs on appeal were final-

ly filed in late November and on the 3rd day of December, 1981
the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on Appeal.
(R-249-50).

The Court found:

"Nothing in plaintiff's Memoranda on App7al or in the record demonstrates any excursion by the Committee or the Director beyond
the scope of the statutory authority . . . u
and also
"The Committee was unusually cautious in its
finding: . . . the findings . . . are based
upon testimony in the record, and upon professional expertise of the members of the Committee. This Court may not substitute its judgment
on factual matters for that of the fact-finding
body unless that body has clearly acted capriciously or arbitrarily, or unless its conclusions
are unsupported by the evidence. Neither circumstance exist here. The record suggests that the
committee was conservative in its findings
rather than otherwise, and those findings entirely support the recommended order entered
by the director. That order is hereby affirmed." (Emphasis added)
Following a decision on appeal in favor of Respondent in
the Third District Court, Appellant entered an appeal before
this Court.

(R-260}.

Appellant also obtained a stay of exe-

cution concerning revocation of his license in this Court,
and is still practicing under the Order of the District Court
of the 19th of February, 1981, more than 14 months after the
Osteopathic Committee found that his methods were unprofessional and should not be allowed in the State of Utah.
Appellant now comes before this Court in an attempt to
gain a second appeal on the matter after failing before the
original, and appropriate, appellate body.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A "DE
NOVO APPEAL". THIS COURT MUST REJECT
ALL BUT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS.
Though Respondents have never heard the term used before,
it appears that the best description of what appellant is
attempting is found in the term "De Novo Appeal."

Appellant

is petitioning this Court to reject and disregard every proceeding, brief, decision and review held in or issued by the
District Court on appeal.

In essence, appellant seeks this

court to "start anew", or in other words, allow a "new" appeal
as if the District Court did not render a decision.

He de-

desires this to be an appeal to the Supreme Court directly from the
administrative body, as if the District Court was not the
Appellate Court and didn't exist.

Appellant is attempting

to have this court invent a legal procedure for purposes of
this

11

appeal 11 that is not permitted by law and is not in

accordance with the Utah Constitution and statutes.
The only argument that presents a constitutional claim
is Point II.

All other arguments have no basis to

be before this court.

Two arguments (which do not allege any

constitutional problems) were never raised before the administrative body or the Appellate (District) Court.

Therefore,

they must be rejected by this Court as this is the improper
place to raise
and VI.

11

new 11 issues.

These two points are Points III

The remainder of Appellant's arguments merely "re-

argue and rehash" the evidence that was thoroughly reviewed
by the Appellate (District) Court.

Thus, all arguments, except the

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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constitutionality under Point II must be rejected and disregarded as a basis for consideration before this Court.
In supporting its position, the respondents deem it
advisable to discuss briefly the definition of "de novo."
Recently this court acknowledged the definition as being
"anew, afresh, a second time."
2d 415 (1981)).

(See Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.

In Pledger, the court continued to discuss

the usage of the doctrine in the context of a
specifically-worded drivers license statute.

There, because

of the language of the statute itself, the wording was
interpreted to mean that the matter was "anew" where new
evid~nce

and testimony could be taken (See U.C.A.

§41-6~44.l(b),

1953 as amended).

The Colorado Court of Appeals also discussed the effect
of "de novo" in the case of Turner v. Passmiller, 532 P. 2d
751 (Colo., 1975).

Therein the court said:

"A trial 'de novo' is commonly understood
as a trial anew of the entire evidence as though
no previous action had been taken." (Emphasis
added)
The statutes of the State of Utah make it clear that in
this case the District Court is the Appellate Court
of all issues.

Any further review from a decision rendered

there is extremely limited in scope.

In the present matter

this Court has the limited scope of reviewing constitutional
issues only.

It is not in a position to disregard the

efforts and review of the Appellate (District) Court and
treat as "insignificant rubble" that which went on before.
Appellant's attempt to "reopen" the entire appeal-even to
the arguing of insufficiency of evidence--is a mockery of
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5

the statutory procedures that have been established for
these licensure cases.

Had the Legislature desired to allow

or prescribe different procedures it would have done so.
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed this question as it
related to the lack of statutory authorization to review
"anew" the decision of the lower court on appeal.

In the case

of Godsal v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Committee, 302
Mich. 652, 5 N.W 2d 519 (1942) the court said:
"In this case we are limited to a
review of the judgment of the circuit court.
There is no procedure b¥ which we may review directly any decision of the administrative tribunal. 11 (Emphasis added)
Jurisdictions with different statutory requirements
have not uniformly followed this position.

But in Utah,

the statutes are clear that the District Court, not the Supreme Court, is the appellate court responsible to decide
the correctness of the decision of the administrative tribunal.
Utah Code Annotated, §58-12-35.1(5) states:
"Any person who shall feel aggrieved by any
action of the board in denying, revoking, or
suspending his license may within 30 days
appeal therefrom to the district court, which
court shall affirm or reverse the action of
the board.

* * *
The district court shall affirm the action
of the board and the director unless the court
finds that the record of the proceedin~s reveals
that the board and director acted capriciously,
arbitrarily or outside the scope of their authority." (emphasis added)
Thus, appellate jurisdiction of all issues of the "recordu
lies with the District Court, not with the Supreme Court.

As

stated in the statute, above, it is the district court that
6
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determines if the board or director acted "capriciously,
arbitrarily, or outside the scope of their authority."
Furthermore, the language of the statute clearly states
that the court (District Court) looks at (reviews) the record.
Record of what?
proceedings?

Record of the administrative proceedings.

What

The proceedings before the particular board from

which the Director has taken his action, causing the licensee
to claim to be aggrieved.

Certainly, there is nothing in

the specific language of the legislatively mandated procedures
as they relate to licensed practitioners under §58-12-35.1,
U.C.A., which could justify taking a position that the proceeding before the District Court could be other than a review
of the record of the hearing before the Osteopathic Committee.
While it is true that U.C.A. §58-1-36 is not entirely
clear, the provision is a general provision applying to boards
that do not have their own statutory procedures on appeal.
The Osteopathic Conunittee has specific procedures to be followed when an aggrieved licensee desires to appeal the decision of the Director of the Division of Registration.

U.C.A.

§58-12-35.1(5) specifically delineates what appellants may do

and what jurisdiction the District Court has in determining
the correctness of the administrative committee.

Without

question, the specific language of the statute under which
this action was appealed and as specifically cited by Appellant [See Notice of Appeal filed by appellant (R-2,3)] presents
to the court the "record" for the court to determine that a
fair hearing was held and that based on the record the action
of the Conunittee was not arbitrary, capricious or outside the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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7

This procedure was followed by the Appellate Court (District Court).

A decision was rendered sustaining the actions

of the Osteopathic Corrunittee.

The opinion issued by the

court, dated December 3, 1981 and entitled "Memorandum Opinion
on Appeal" (emphasis added; R-249-51) states in particularity:
"Nothing in plaintiff's Memorandum on Appeal
or in the record demonstrates any excursion by
the Committee or the Director beyond the scope of
their statutory authority . . .
It should be noted that the transcript of the
hearing before the Osteopathic Committee consists
of six volumes, numbering 1189 pages. The Court
has read the entire transcript, and examined all of
the Exhibits described in Respondents' Filing of
Record of Board Hearing, together with the extensive
Memoranda filed by counsel for the parties.

* * * *
While it is true that some of the testimony was in conflict, Dr. Vance denying some of the
allegations made by former patients, there is an
evidentiary basis for the Committee's findings, and
no basis for a claim of denial of due process. The
Committee was at liberty to make its own judgroen~
on credibility.

* * * * *
. . . This Court may not substitute its judgment on factual matters for that of the fact-finding
body unless that body has clearly acted capriciously
or arbitrarily, or unless its conclusions are unsupported by the evidence. Neither circumstance exists
here. The record sug9ests that the Committee was
conservative in its findings rather than otherwise,
and those findings entirely support the recommended
Order entered by the Director. That Order is hereby
affirmed." (Emphasis added).
Respondents encourage the court to review the entire
Opinion.

What is desired to be emphasized is that the Appel-

late Judge reviewed everything, pondered deeply and made her
decision after much thought.

This decision "on appeal"

(R-249) was not a "fly-by-night" decision. Her Honor specif-

ically
"The
record
suggests
trby the Institute~" of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored said:
by the S.J. Quinney
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conservative in its findings . . . " (emphasis added).

Re-

spondents point out that the entire record before the Court
below, including Appellant's own brief (R-193) refers to the
matter being before the District Court "on appeal."
Rule 8l(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pocedure specifically
states that those rules apply to administrative matters (appeals,
etc.) unless there is specific statutory language to the contrary.

Taken literally, as it should be, and if U.C.A.

§58-12-35.1(5) did not exist, then the argument could be made
that the appeal would be to the Supreme Court.
not the case.

But this is

U.C.A. §58-23-35.1(5) is clear that the Dis-

trict Court, not the Supreme Court, has the responsibility,
obligation, and jurisdiction to make the appellate decision.
Had the Legislature intended it to be otherwise, the
statute would have placed that responsibility on the Supreme
Court by statute as it has done in numerous other instances.
For example, Decisions of the Utah Liquor Control Commission
(U.C.A. §32-1-32.6), Industrial Commission (U.C.A. §35-1-83)
and the Public Service Commission (U.C.A. §54-7-16) are appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.

In the case of the Tax Commis-

sion, the Legislature has given two options:

obtain a trial

de novo in District Court or go directly to the Supreme Court
(U.C.A. §54-24-2).
Thus, it is seen that the jurisdiction for appeal lies
with the District Court.

The appeal was heard (consisting of

a review of the entire record made before the Osteopathic
Committee), a decision rendered, and only issues of constitutional import can now be raised before this body.
9

The Utah
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Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides that appeals
from Justice courts lie to the District Court "on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District
Courts on such appeals shall be final, except in cases involvving the validity or constitutionality of a statute."

(empha-

sis added).
This court has ruled in numerous cases that it will not
review the evidence again, but limits its review from appeals
to the District Courts to constitutional issues only.

In the

case of State v. Robinson, 23 U.2d 78, 457 P. 2d 969 (1969)
the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal _o_f

a

misdemeanor

conviction "on its own" because the constitutionality of a
statute was not challenged.

That appeal, as is the case in

this instant appeal, is based on everything but the challenge
of a statute.

The Court said:

"The appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor in a justice of the peace court. He
appealed to the District Court where on a trial
de novo, he was again convicted. He now attempts to appeal to this court and claims error
below in that the court improperly received evidence at the trial. He makes no contention that
the statute under which he is charged is invalid.
[Quotes Article VIII, Section 9]
This court on a number of occasions has held
that in cases such as this the decision of the
district court is final and that a further appeal
would not lie except where the validity or constitutionality of a statute is invoked." (Emphasis
added. )
Also, the Legislature amended U.C.A. §78-4-11 in 1977 and
in 1981 as it relates to appeals to the District Court from
the Circuit Court.

There as well, the decision is final.
10
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Though the constitutional provisions cited above do not
expressly include administrative appeals, there is no valid
reason why the procedures for cases arising in administrative
agencies should be any different.

To say there is a differ-

~

ence is a great injustice.

a·

to appeal to this court would be individuals who could lose

Under the prohibition of a right

their right to liberty by being placed in jail, as a result of
a conviction before the Justice or Circuit Courts and yet
allowing those with, for example, a day's suspension of regulatory licenses to appeal to the Supreme Court, after having a
District Court affirm the decision of the regulatory body.

In

the P!esent case, although it is a revocation, instead of a
limited suspension, the legal rationale and issues are still
the same--the appellant has no right to a

11

de novo appeal. 11

It is not even allowed in other appeals from the District
Court by statute and constitution as discussed above.
Based on the foregoing, respondent contends that the
appellant has had his appeal and has lost.
to a second appeal.

He is not entitled

He has not claimed the invalidity or un-

constitutionality of any statute.

All of the issues except

two have been briefed, argued and ruled on in the Appellate
(District) Court.

The two issues that were not raised and

argued below are points III and VI.

They were never raised

below, are not argued to be a denial of any constitutional
rights and this court in numerous cases has established the
most basic premise before it that new issues cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal (and in this case for the first
time on a second appeal)!

These issues were also never
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raised at the hearing before the Osteopathic Committee.

Cer-

tainly, at this point of time, Appellant has "waived" these
issues.

They cannot be allowed at this point even if the Court

allows other issues of this appeal to be heard.
In essence, Appellant's "appeal" is improperly before
this body and should be dismissed.

This court should not review

again all of the evidence that has already been reviewed by
the Appellate Judge and ruled on.

Further, the Court should

treat this case no differently than those under Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution.

There have been no

challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, and, therefore, no appeal lies.

Lastly, the claim

lations has been waived on two occasions.

of_~nadequate

regu-

No matter what

this Court decides as to the other arguments, this issue
should be rejected by this court as untimely and inappropriate.
The proper course of action for this court is to dismiss
this appeal for lack of any jurisdiction over the purported
"appeal" to this body.

If the Court does believe it has the

right to hear some argument it should be limited only to the
constitutionality of the Board proceeding as alleged in its
make-up.

All other arguments are inappropriate and should not

be considered.
Respondents, however, not knowing the view of the court
on these issues, deem it advisable to respond to all arguments even though they feel this Court should not review
them.

As such, they will be treated accordingly.

12
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POINT II:
THE PARTICIPATION OF DR. GREENWOOD ON THE
OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE DID NOT INVALIDATE OR
MAKE VOID THE PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant begins his attack on the decision of the Osteopathic Committee by adulterating both the findings of the
District Court and the actual situation that presented itself.

By propounding that interpretation, Appellant is at-

tempting to confuse the issues before this Court--issues
that were fully briefed and ruled on earlier.
The record is void of any "admission" that Dr. Greenwood
was not qualified to sit as a member of the Committee.

Ap-

pellant presents.that position as one of the undisputed "facts"
of the case.

(See Appellant's Brief, Page 4.)

Respondents

have consistently maintained and the Court so found that Dr.
Greenwood was a "de facto officer who acted under color of
law and authority" (R-149).

As such, the Court found that

as a "de facto officer" she was authorized to sit on the
Committee and rule on the issues presented to it in this
case.
The entire argument of Appellant as presented by his
Motion to Dismiss
(R

(R

79-80) and the accompanying Memorandum

83-91) centered around residency and licensing require-

ments "within" the State of Utah.

In essence, Appellant

cites U.C.A. §58-1-6 as the basis for some "monstrous" reason which precludes Dr. Greenwood from being able to render
any opinion at all as to the propriety of Appellant's actions.

This position is absurd.

Nowhere has Dr. Greenwood's competence, professional
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ability, knowledge, or credentials even been questioned. In
fact, Appellant hasn't even done so in this appeal.

Appel-

lant knows that Dr. Greenwood, a practicing psychologist as
her specialty in Osteopathic Medicine, is eminently qualified
and knowledgeable in the field of Osteopathic Medicine.

She

recieved her degree from the College of Osteopathic Medicine
in Des Moines, Iowa, in June of 1968 and has been licensed
in and practiced in Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin and Utah
continually since July of 1969.

(R. 141-144.)

If anything,

the fact that she has had experience in Osteopathic Medicine
in three other states (Missouri, Iowa and Wisconsin) before
coming to Utah to live, adds credence to

th~

position that

she has a broad understanding of theory and practice-in her
profession.
In support of this position, Respondents refer to the
leading authority in the area of a physician's care and
knowledge in going from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

In

Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (1964), a San Francisco Physician
was called as an expert witness regarding medical practices
in Moab, Utah.

Certainly, here, the discrepancies of the

size and sophistication of jurisdictions are obvious.

Riley

held that a physician has adequate knowledge to testify as
an expert witness in a case if he is a physician in the
community or similar corrununity.

The San Francisco physician

qualified under this definition to present expert testimony
for situations in Moab, Utah.
Certainly, Dr. Greenwood had the experience and knowledge
from similar corrununities such as Des Moines, Iowa (roughly
14
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equivalent to the communities here) to be qualified to sit
as an expert in peer review.

Medical knowledge and theory

are fast becoming, and in many respects have become, cosmopolitan in nature, being uniform in all areas of the country.
Respondent maintains that Dr. Greenwood was qualified
in every way professionally to sit on the Board.

The record

substantiates this fact and Appellant himself does not
dispute it.
In essence, a highly qualified physician sat "de facto"
under color of authority to review the evidence in the
original hearing below.

Respondents deem it extreme]_y

important to point out to ·this Court that it._wasn't just any
"Tom, Dick or Harry" that was pulled off the street
"fill" the Board position.

ro

Never has Dr. Greenwood's compe-

tence or professional qualifications been questioned.
With this keenly in mind, Respondents now point out
that all Appellant could do to attack the Committee's

deci~

sion is cite a five year licensure rule which can wel.l. be
seen as a procedural dinosaur, that has no bearing on the
correctness of a decision and itself has been seen by the
legislature as a requirement having no bearing on the substantive outcome of cases heard by committees.

This require-

ment was repealed by the Utah Legislature in the 1981 Session.
The Court did find in its Order that based on the
residency and licensure requirements as per Utah Code Ann.
§58-1-6, she was not qualified to "be appointed."

(R.-149.)

Nonetheless, the Court held, as previously stated, that Dr.
Greenwood sat as a "de facto" member.

Her qualifications
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professionally qualified her to sit "de facto" and render a
fair decision with the other members of the Committee.
Appellant's brief is essentially a restatement of his
memorandum accompanying the Motion to Dismiss in the Court
below.

Only two cases not cited in that memorandum have been

added here.

Nonetheless, Respondent deems it necessary to

respond with basically the same argument and cases as it did
below so this court can be fully advised of Respondent's
position.
Counsel for Appellant himself advocated a position before the
District Court that he has now changed.

The Court and counsel

for Appellant had a lengthy dialogue about this matter where
counsel took a different position.
Appellant cites 1 Am.Jur. §69 (Appellant's Brief, Page 9)
declaring before this body that the decision is void.

Yet

before the District Court, he maintained:
MR. WALKER: But in saying that our statement
is that therefore it was not a duly constituted
committee, therefore jurisdiction never vested
in that corrunittee.
THE COURT: Well, if that is true, then
there was no jurisd1ct1on to do anything
that that board has done during the entire
period that Dr. Greenwood has sat on it.
MR. WALKER: Your Honor, that is the whole
point. The case law says that it may be voidable
at the instance of an aggrieved party.

* * *

THE COURT: If I rule that that decision
was void for lack of JUr1sd1ct1on, then there
is no more jurisdiction, every order that
the board has entered is likewise void.
MR. WALKER:. Your Honor, quoting the
case that they cite in their brief, -THE COURT:

Let me be sure I understand
16
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your position first. Do you claim that
that the order is void for lack of jurisdiction, or do you simply claim that it is
voidable on some due process grounds?
MR. WALKER: We say that it is voidable.
In other words, we have no idea what the
position of that committee is in dealing
with anything else. We are merely saying
that by the case law that this decision is
voidable by the court.
THE COURT: Well, then your argument
is not a jurisdictional argument? It's
a due process argument. Because I don't
see how you can argue where there's no
jurisdiction you have only got a voidable
order. If there is no jurisdiction there
is no basis for proceeding.

It!

* * *
MR. WALKER: . . . I think the other actions
by that board have not aggrieved anyone. If
they have licensed people, if they have
passed standards, there has no one been aggrieved,
and that's why the case law says that it
can be raised by the person aggrieved.
(R. 291-2, 298; emphasis added.)
The above establishes several things:

first, Appellant

maintains that Dr. Greenwood could sit and act.
said above, the Committee could make
could affect many, many people.
he says it can't.

11

As he

standards 11 that

Then in the same breath

Second of all, by saying the order is

only voidable and not void, jurisdiction vests and the
question of due process goes to the "fairness" of the
hearing.

In this matter, the fairness is totally

substantiated.
not "void."

Mr. Walker maintained that the order was

If the order is not void (as counsel admits) then

there is no requirement that the order or any decision
everbe declared void.
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Appellant has not shown where there has been any denial
of any right that has "tainted" the decision.

Appellant

cites State of Utah in re LGW, 638 P.2d 527 (Utah, 1981)
claiming there was no existence of an "appropriate
tribunal."

By his own admissions, above, the Committee had

jurisdiction.

One wonders whether Appellant would

claim the decision void had the Committee ruled in
his favor?

To declare it voidable at his choice must have

some restriction.

That restriction is that at no point at

the hearing level was the issue ever raised.

One cannot

remain silent and only after an adverse decision claim there
was some error which "voided" a decision not_liked by the
party.
The law on this entire matter is well estab1ished.
Appellant has mistated both statutory and case iaw.

The

jurisdiction of the Committee is clearly established by
statute.

The Committee acting as a unit was acting as an

arm of the State, and its actions as the record shows were
competent and just.

This was pointed out very clearly in

United States v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1945)
wherein the Court stated:
A person actually performing the duties
of an office under color of title is an
officer de facto, and his acts as such
officer are valid so far as the public or
third parties who have an interest in them
are concerned, [cites omitted] and neither
his eligibilit~ to appointment nor the validity of his official acts can be inquired into
except in a proceeding brought for that
purpose. (Emphasis added.)
The North Carolina Supreme Court spelled out this posi18
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tion in more detail in the case of In re Wingler, 231 N.C.
530, 58 S.E.2d 372 (1950):

For all practical purposes, a judge de
facto is a judge de jure as to all partieSother than the State itself. His right or
title to his office cannot be impeached in a
habeas corpus proceeding or in any other
collateral way. . . . So far as the public
and third persons are concerned, a judge de
facto is competent to do whatever may be done
by a judge de jure. In consequence, acts
done by a judge de facto in the discharge of
the duties of his JUd1c1al office are as
effectual so far as the rights of third
persons or the public are concerned as if he
were a judge de jure.
Appellant is attempting to collaterally attack actions by
a

11

de facto" board member who acted under color of title

after.decisions were rendered and not directly on a prospective
basis as indicated above.
Dr. Greenwood was sworn in as a board member and
acted as such at the hearing.

Her "color of title" is

further established by the certificate issued verifying
this fact.

(R. 139.)

Respondent has found numerous cases from many
jurisdictions sustaining the actions of public officials
and/or administrative officers and members whor though not
properly sitting according to law (de jure), were in fact
sitting under color of authority (de facto).
case here.

Such is the

No cases have been located "invalidating" those

based on the arguments pressed by Appellant.
In Schaffield v. Hebel, 192 S.W.2d 84 (Ky, 1946),
the Court of Appeals said the following:
An officer de facto is to be distinguished
from a mere usurper or one not having some
color of title to the office, and to be
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one whose title is not good in point of law
but who is in fact in the unobstructed possession
of an office and is discharging those duties
in full view of the public in such manner and under
such circumstances as not to present the appearance of being an intruder or usurper.

* * *
This is in accordance with the general
rule that the exercise by an officer de facto
of authority which lawfully appertains to the
office of which he has possession is as valid
and binding as if exercised by an officer de
jure, and an act by the one has the same
force and effect as an act of the other so
far as it is for the interest of the public
or of third persons. (Emphasis added.)
In 1978, the North Carolina Court discussed this
issue in the case of People v. Beach, 242 S.E.2d 796 (N.C.
1978):
A usurper in office is distinguished from
a de facto officer in that a usurper takes
possession of office and undertakes to act officially without any authority, either actual or
apparent. Since he is not an officer at all
or for any purpose, his acts are absolutely
void, and they can be impeached at any time in
any proceeding. [Citations omitted.] The acts
of a de facto officer are, however, valid as
to the-public and third persons. Norfleet v.
Staton, supra. Thus, "So far as the public and
third persons are concerned, a judge de facto is
competent to do whatever may be done by a JUdge
de jure. In consequence, acts done by a jud~e
de facto in the discharge of the duties of his
judicial office are as effectual so far as the
rights of third persons or the public are concerned as if he were a judge de jure .. (Emphasis
added.)
It is exceedingly clear that Dr. Greenwood was not a usurper
and therefore her acts as a sitting member of the Board cannot
be challenged now.

Her acts stand as they relate to Dr.

Vance.
Again, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in Sheldon
v. Green, 77 P. 2d 114 (Okla., 1938):
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Having come to the conclusion that until the
filing of the opinion in State ex rel. Williams v.
Ba~so~, supra, .he was a de facto officer, the next
principle applicable is that the acts of a de facto
officer are as binding as those of a de jure officer.
This principle is well recognized, and applies as
thoroughly to the office of judge as it does to
other public offices. (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue
in the case In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103 (Utah, 1927),
where challenge was made to a District Judge sitting on the
Supreme Court to temporarily "fill-in" because of the death
of a Supreme Court Judge.

The court soundly rejected the

arguments raised against the District Judge as follows:
. . . though it be assumed that Judge
McCrea was not a judge de jure, he certainly was
a judge de facto. That he was qualified as a district judge to sit in the Supreme Court in some
contingencies is not disputed. That he was designated by the Supreme Court to sit, and that he
sat and participated in the case in pursuance
thereof, is also not disputed . . . . Under such
circumstances Judge McCrea was at least a judge
de facto, if not a judge de jure, and the decision
concurred in by him is as binding on the respondent as though Judge McCrea had been judge
de jure. (Emphasis added.)
The cases are even more numerous in sustaining the decision of the Committee.

Dr. Greenwood, though not acting de

jure in all aspects, was indeed acting de facto, and that
decision is as binding as if she had been sitting de jure
with the necessary years of residency.

Extended periods of

residency for voting and other rights have been struck down
by the courts as having no reasonable connection with those
practices.

Certainly, Dr. Greenwood was and always has been

"competent" from her schooling and experience to sit in judgment in such a case.

Appellant is really arguing an insig-
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nificant point in hopes of clouding the more important position that in every way Dr. Greenwood is professionally qualified.

As alluded to before, the complained of Committee mem-

ber is not someone "pulled off the street."
Appellant has cited only two new authorities in support of his entire claim that were not presented below.
The first is Central Bank and Trust v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d
14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) which stands for the proposition
that courts will not interfere with the decisions of administrative tribunals unless it appears that they have acted
in excess of their powers.

Interestingly enough, the Su-

preme Court of the State of Utah in Brimhall stated:
"Our duty is to look on the whole evidence
in the light favorable to the determination made
by the bank commissioner and he trial court,
and to sustain them if there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence to justify doing so. In
the field of administrative law the assumption
is indulged that the administrator (or administrative tribunal) possesses superior knowledge and expertise because of specialized training and experience, and the focus of interest
within the particular field. For this reason
the well-established rule is that courts indulge him considerable latitude in the determination he makes on questions of fact and also
in the exercise of his discretion with respect
to the responsibilities which the law imposed
upon him; and they will not interfere therewith unless it appears that he acted in excess
of his powers, or that he so abused his discretion that his action was capricious or arbitrary."
This statement goes not only to the powers of the administrative body but also to the reasons an individual is made
a member of such a body.

The "superior knowledge and exper-

tise because of specialized training and experience" as
evidenced by Dr. Greenwood's excellent medical background
22
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and record would be proof that she was "qualified" to serve
upon the Osteopathic Committee, even though the specific licensure time period within the State of Utah was not met.
The other new authority cited is Stahl v. Reinggold
County, 187 Iowa 1324, 175 N.W. 772, (1964), which is cited
along with In re Weston Benefit Assessment Special Road
District, 294

s.w. 2d 353 (Mo. App. 1956) as a footnote to a

statement in American Jurisprudence, §69 (p. 864).

The dis-

cussion of the American jurisprudence article concerns the
actions of officers specifically prohibited by statute from
acting in an administrative capacity.

An examination of the

Stahl and the In re Weston Benefit cases will show that the
intent of the Legislature in specifically prohibiting an individual from acting in an administrative capacity must be
present.

In In re Weston a member of the Board had a pe-

cuniary interest in land being purchased by the county.

The

statutory section in question provided that uno judge or
county court shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which
he has a personal interest or is related to either party".
That section is a clear and specific statement of the Legislature disallowing an individual for specific reasons the
right to act in an administrative capacity.

Also, in Stahl

as annotated in the American Law Reports, a member of
an administrative body held land in a drainage district which
would be greatly increased in value by the action of the administrative body.

It was stated in that case that

"An express statutory requirement that officials establishing a drainage district
shall be disinterested was not necessary to
render invalid the acts of interested offi-
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Clearly the subject of the annotation in American Jurisprudence makes clear that actions of officials who have personal
or pecuniary interest in the subject of the administrative
body's actions, even thugh not specifically prohibited by
statutes, are void.

There is no connection between that

annotation and the case at hand.

Dr. Greenwood had no

personal or pecuniary interest in this matter and the statute which is relied on by appellant did not specifically
prohibit the actions of officials becuase of their residency
or the period of their licensure.

It merely stated a time

period for which appointments should be.made.
Adding to the theory that a de facto official's_ opinion should not be attacked on statutory grounds is the doctrine stated in Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana v. Armington, 178 N.E. 2d 741 (Ind., 1962).
In

this case, a decision of the Board was questioned after

the conclusion of the hearing, on appeal, because a member
of the Board should not have participated in the hearing.
The court stated:
Although the appellee was aware of the
fact that Dr. Elkenberry had preferred charges
against him by reason of the notice he received
from the board which stated such fact appellee
failed to make an~ prompt objection to the board
member participating in the proceeding at the
time of the hearing . . . it would not render the
proceedings of the board in which he participated void, but . . . merely voidable. In such
case disqualification may be waived. It is
the general rule that unless objection is made
at the earliest opportunity to the right of the
person claimed to be disqualified to act it
will be deemed waived. (Emphasis added.)
This position has been followed in other jurisdictions
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as well.

The Illinois court said in Commissioners of Union

Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N.E. 376
(1908):

In this view of the matter, Binder was
not competent to act as a commissioner in
spreading the assessment. The objection which
we have sustained is one which must be made
before the judgment of confirmation i s entered. If not so made, it is deemed waived,
and will never thereafter be of any avail.
If the assessment has been spread by commissioners who own land in the district and has
been confirmed without any objection being
filed which raises the question of their competency, the judgment of confirmation is valid
and binding, precisely as it would have been
had the commissioners owned no land within
the district. (Emphasis added.)
(See a.lso:

Carr v .. Duhme, 78 N.E. 322 (Ind., 1906).

In a more recent case, the Oklahoma court entertained
an appeal from the lower court challenging the right of a
judge to conduct a preliminary hearing when, as here, the
claim was made that he did not qualify.
448 P. 2d 253 (Okla. Cir., 1968)).

(Bennett v. State,

The court stated:

We are of the opinion, and therefore hold,
in the light of Rath v. LaFon, supra, that the
acts of Judge Porter in conducting the preliminary
hearing on the 28th day of July, 1965, and
holding the defendant bound over to the District Court, were acts of a de facto judge having
the same statutes as the acts of a de jure judge.
Moreover, we are of the further opinion that
in order to preserve this question, the defendant should have challenged the jurisdiction of
Judge Porter in the trial court, excepted to
the ruling of the trial court, preserved this
in his Motion for New Trial, in which event we
would have the question properly before us for
review on appeal, for we have repeatedly held
that only those questions which were raised in
the trial court and on which adverse rulings
were made and exceptions taken, and which are
then incorporated in a Motion for New Trial and
assigned as error in the Petition in Error,
will be considered on appeal. (Emphasis
Sponsoredadded.)
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(See also Board of Medical Registration v. Armington (supra)).
Though some of the cases deal with judges, the applicability to the administrative field is obvious and spelled
out by the courts themselves as stated in the cases cited.
The record is perfectly clear that no objection was ever made
at the administrative level as to the qualifications of
Dr. Greenwood.
In the case at hand, Appellant knew that Dr. Greenwoodhad not been licensed in the State of Utah for five years
preceding her appointment.

Dr. Vance approved the licen

sure application, personally signing his name authorizing
the issurance of the license on June 6, 1978
of the Osteopathic Committee (R 140, 144).

~as

chairman

Appellant al-

lowed the hearing to proceed for five days with this knowledge and never objected to the make-up of the Committee.
Under the cases stated above, the Appellant has clearly waived
his right to object to the make-up of the Committee and subjected himself to their scrutiny by his informed silence.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly mandated that one
who remains silent, and allows a court to entertain error or
approves what takes place, cannot later come forward and complain of the error he himself allowed.

The court held in

the case of Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104
Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347 (1943):
A party who takes a position which either
leads a court into error or by conduct approves
the error committed by the court, cannot later
take advantage of such error in procedure.
Cases on this subject are also numerous, but respondent sees
26
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no necessity of citing more.

By admitting that the order is

only "voidable" and not "void", this Court requires one to
protect his position by timely objection.

Such objection was

never raised, and appellant cannot now claim the order is
"voidable" in spite of his silence.
Further, the Motion of Appellant should be denied, if
for no other reason than the same Committee would hear the same
testimony as it did previously.

With the 1981 legislative

amendment doing away with residency, Dr. Greenwood qualifies in every respect to sit on the Board and continues to
sit.
two

The three who heard the original case, in addition to
o~hers,

(Committee of five was instituted) would make

the decision if remanded.

For judicial and administrative

economy, it would appea that the remanding of this matter to
the same Board who heard the case originally would be a fruitless waste of time, energy and public funds.
Several courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have ruled that the same judges and the same administrative boards may rehear matters on remand with the claim of
prejudice not being allowed to stand.

In the Board of Med-

ical Examiners v. Steward, 102 A. 2d 248 (Md., 1954), the
Maryland court held:
But in the absence of a constitutional
or statutory provision to the contrary, the
judge who presided at the trial of a case
which is reversed on appeal and remanded for
a new trial is not disqualified to retry the
case.
And as to the specifics of that case, the court said:
This general rule, which has always been
accepted as applicable to judges in Maryland, is
undoubtedly likewise applicable to members of
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administrative agencies, for usually the procedure of administrative agencies is not as
formal and strict as that of the courts.
The court cited a previous Washington case to sustain its
statements:
Thus, in Sutton v. City of Washington, 4
Ga. App. 30, 60 S.E. 811, where the City Council
had convicted a person of unlawfully keeping
intoxicating liquors for sale, it was held that,
after the case had been remanded for a second
trial, the Council was not disqualified from hearing the case again.
As stated previously, the Supreme Court has already
answered the question of propriety in such a situation.

In

the case N.L.R.B. v. Donnelly, 309 U.S. 219, 67 S.Ct. 756
(1947), the Court said:
Certainly it is not the rule of judicial
administration, that, statutory requirements
apart, see Judicial Code, § 21, 28 U.S.C. §25,
28 U.S.C.A. § 25, a judge is disqualified
from sitting in a retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find no warrant
for imposing upon administrative agencies a
stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly
against a party in the first hearing.
Respondent is aware of no statute that precludes the same in
the State of Utah.

Once again it is pointed out that this

"committee of Experts in the Field" ruled on "unprofessional
conduct"--something Dr. Greenwood was admittedly qualified
to decide.
The statute cited by the Appellant as the basis of
his Motion has been amended and now has no requirement of
"time licensed in Utah" for membership on the Committee
(U.C.A., § 58-1-6, as amended, 1981).

Thus, the Committee,

under current law would be the same that heard the initial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
28 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. .llii

five days of testimony.

The witnesses would be similar and

the record, which is voluminous, would have to be restated
as they were before, all for the sake of making a second
"record."

Under current law, Dr. Greenwood is sitting "de

jure" as well as "de facto" and would be sitting on the Committee at the time of rehearing.
The best interests of the public and all parties concerned would clearly not be served if a remand was made on
the grounds claimed by Appellant.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS
IN THE REVOCATION OF HIS LICENSE.
The requirements of an administrative body to assure an
individual due process in the State of Utah, was stated in
the case of State of Utah in re L.G.W., supra.

In that de-

cision the Court stated that the requirements for due process
are:
"(l) the existence of an appropriate
tribunal; (2) inquiry into the merits of
the question presented; (3) notice of
the purpose of inquiry; (4) opportunity to
appear in person or by counsel; ( 5) ·fair
opportunity to be heard; and (6) judgment
rendered in the record thus made. 11
It is the position of Respondents that in fact, Appellant
has been afforded every one of the appropriate measures
stated above.
First, there has never been any claim by the Appellant
that the matter should not have been heard by the Osteopathic Committee.

In fact, there is no other committee constituted
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which is capable or authorized by law to sit in matters involving osteopathic physicians and surgeons.
an

11

Thus, there was

appropriate tribunal. 11 Appellant's entire claim of "denial of

due process" centers around the question as to the propriety of
Dr. Greenwood sitting "de facto" instead of "de jure."

As

discussed in Respondent's Point II, above, Dr. Greenwood was
professionaly capable and competent to render a "fair and impartial11 decision, which she did.

No claim is made that a

more eminent osteopath in the State of utah could or would
have rendered a different decision.
ing

11

The mere lack of meet-

residencey 11 requirements when otherwise qualified to

render a decision that has little or no

bea~ing

on residency

at all falls short of any level of constitutional import.
Further analysis is found in Point II, above, and will not
be repeated here.
Second, a five-day hearing with voluminous testimony
and exhibits was held inquiring "into the merits of the
questions presented."

Third, notice was adequate and timely.

Fourth, Appellant appeared both in person and through competent legal counsel during the entire hearing.

Fifth,

Appellant produced numerous witnesses, including himself, and
cross-examined Division witnesses.

As is seen by the record,

Appellant was given ample opportunity and time to present his
case.

Finally, a judgment and decision was rendered "based

on the evidence at the hearing."

The Committee was very

careful in its decision, finding specifically in 26 of the
allegations that there was no cause of action and that in
approximately 14 of the allegations the evidence sustained
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a determination of unprofessional conduct

{See Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law of Osteopathic Committee, R 170172).

There is no evidence or valid argument that the Apellant was. denied any of the six requirements listed above.

In

fact, Appellant only claims a problem with "appropriate tribunal" which has been adequately discussed, above.

POINT IV
THE TERM UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AS STATED IN THE
UTAH STATUTES IS APPROPRIATE TO COMMON UNDERSTANDING BY MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION BEING REGULATED
AND PROVIDES FAIR NOTICE TO PROFESSIONALS OF THE
GROUNDS UPON 'WHICH THEIR LICENSES MAY BE REVOKED.
Appellant relies upon the case Tuma v. The Board of Nursing, 100 Id. 74, 593 P. 2d 711 (1979) to stand for the proposition that specific acts must be listed to put the professional on notice prior to disciplinary action of said professional.
Tuma is of limited scope as it relates to certain "types" of
actions.

Appellant failed to cite the recent leading case in

this area which not only establishes the standard relative to
"unprofessional conduct 11 as a meaningful guidline, but unequivocably distinguises each case cited by him.

This case, Chas-

tek v. Anderson, 83 Ill. 2d 502, 416 N.E. 2d 247 (1981), involved a dentist who was charged with "unprofessional conduct"
in the way he treated three patients.

He claimed that this

phraseology was unconstitutionally vague in that the statutes
did not specifically state that the type of treatment he gave
was improper.
Appellant in Chastek cited Tuma and other cases (some
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cited by Appellant here) to support his argum.ent that the term
"unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" was vague and that
the statute did not afford him advance notice of the type
of acts that constituted "unprofessional conduct."

The court

said:
"None of these cases, however, found
a statute allowing license revocation for
unprofessional conduct to be unprofessional . . . In none of these cases, however,
did the acts reflect on the person's fitness to practice his profession. In fact,
several of these cases imply that the statutes in question did place the person on notice that conduct relating to his fitness to
practice would fall under the statute.u
In essence, the Court distinguishes "acts" that relate
to one's fitness to practice from acts that-wouldn't relate to
one's fitness to practice.

Tuma involved a nurse discussing

alternative treatments with a patient.

Such discussions were

not found to reflect upon her fitness as a nurse.
There is no question that the acts of Appellant (i.e.,
promising recovery from terminal diseases, using absurd and
"quackery" procedures such as Kirlian photography, hand pressure diagnosis, taking images of thumbprints, etc.) reflect
on his competence, professionalism and in essence, his fitness
to practice.
The Court in Chastek cited numerous jurisdictions where
the "validity of similar statutes providing for license revocation against constitutional challenges based on vagueness," was upheld.

It cited cases from California, Arkan-

sas, Florida, Texas, Oregon, Minnesota, New York, Michigan,
Colorado and Illinois.
32
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In discussing the California case of Shay v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 81 Cal. App. 3rd 564, 146 Cal. Rptr 653
(1978) the court in Chastek stated:
The court held, however, that it was unnecessary for a statute to enumerate specific
acts which constitute unprofessional conduct. It analyzed the statute in terms of
its purpose, which was to assure the high
quality of medical practice. The court then
held that although unprofessional conduct
should not be given an overly broad connotation, "it must relate to conduct which
indicates an unfitness to practice medicine."
Respondent maintains that if every possible act like
"cracking a raw egg on each patient's teeth and holding his
head under water until he passes out" were codified as unprofessional conduct, there would be millions of possibilities and even then, the best minds in the profession could
not think of them all.

It's like posing the question, "What

is the largest possible number?"

Once one states what he

thinks it is, someone else only needs to add one and make
it larger.
The courts have realized this dilemma and have held
that the Committees or Boards themselves determine the scope
of the statutory language.

The Oregon Supreme Court in

Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or. 441, 378 p_ 2d
945 (1963) stated:
"The fact that it is impossible to catalogue
all of the types of professional misconduct
is the very reason for setting up the statutory
standard in broad terms and delegating to the
to the Board the function of evaluating the
conduct in each case."
In commenting thereon, the Chastek court stated that the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fining language of the statute was not the factor that gave
the physician notice that his conduct was unprofessional.
Also, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Reyburn v. Minnesota State Board of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d 351
(1956) held:
"Unprofessional conduct is of itself without
amplification, a sufficiently definite ground
upon which the Board may revoke or suspend a
license."
Relying on the cases cited above and its own analysis, the court in Chastek held:
"The rationale in the cases upholding the
statutes is that it is impossible to categorize all the acts constituting terms such
as 'unprofessional conduct' or 'gfqss immorality' . Further, terms such as -' unprofessional conduct are susceptible to common understanding by the members of the profession.
When combined with the legislative purpose
of protecting the public from people unfit
to practice, the term 'unprofessional conduct'
provides fair notice to the licensed professional and is not unconstitutionally vague.
11
(Emphasis added)
The Utah statute relied on in the hearing before the
administrative body, as cited in Paragraph 5 of the petition
(R 173), is U.C.A. §58-12-36(15) which includes the following as a specific definition of "unprofessional conduct."
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary
to the recognized standards of ethics of the
medical profession, or any conduct or practice
which does or might constitute a danger to the
health, welfare or safety of the patient or
the public,or any conduct, practice or condition which does or might impair the ability
safely and skillfully to practice medicine.
This provision was enacted in 1969.

In 1976 the act was

amended to include the additional language:
(17) Violation of any rule or regulation of the physician's licensina board.
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establishing a standard of professional con
duct.
Appellant claims that no "regulations" were promulgated
delineating what conduct was improper.

The above clearly dem-

onstrates that paragraph (15) is extremely specific and meets
every test as discussed by the courts above.

It is obvious

that the Utah Legislature did not want to restrict the Committee and added (17).

Even though there were no promulgated

rules under (17), paragraph (15) is sufficient.

Under the

cases above, all that is needed is the term "unprofessional conduct" with no further definition necessary.

Here,

the Legislature was very specific.
"r'n Chastek, the court in discussing the specifics of that
case which involved only three situations said:
"Thus, the plaintiff should be on notice
that he could have his license revoked for unprofessional conduct that is harful to the
health, safety and welfare of the public. We
are not here faced with one alleged act of
negligence. In this case plaintiff is alleged
to have committed repeated negligent acts (3
specific acts); clearly repeated acts of
negligence by a detnal practitioner towards
his patients are actions that endanger the
health, safety and welfare of the public and
therefore constitute unprofessional conduct.
It is unreasonable to presume that a dentist is
not apprised of the possibility his license
could be in jeopardy for repeated acts of
incompetent treatment."
The court then went on to hold that these three acts of
negligence constituted "repeated acts" and upheld the revocation of the license.
It is thus perfectly clear that the Osteopathic Committee had the duty to examine the evidence and determine
whether or not such action fit within the definition of
11

,11n1w'"'-F 0 ~~.;'"' ........ ,

'"'"'"'""'...::i,.,...+-

11

as claimed in the petition.
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In the case at hand the Committee found that Dr. Vance
had, not just in three instances, but in multiple instances,
acted in a manner which was unprofessional and medically
unsound.
It was the statutory duty of the Committee to make those
decisions, and no amount of specificity in the statute concerning unprofessional conduct could relieve the Board of
that duty.

As stated in Chastek, it is clearly impossible to

catalogue all types of professional misconduct.

Therefore,

Appellant's assertion that the Committee should have established specific standards of conduct is contrary to legislative intent and without ·merit.

POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF THE OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE
WERE BASED ON PROPER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
AND WERE BASED UPON VALID EVIDENCE.
Point IV of Appellant's brief reflects a complete lack
of understanding administrative evidentiary standards in
State of Utah.

th~

Qualified and competent professional indi-

viduals serve on administrative committees because no one
better may sit in peer review to determine whether the evidence is valid and supports the allegations made.

The

Committee is in essence a committee of experts who determine
whether conduct is professional or unprofessional.

In the

case at hand the administrative committee did allow hearsay
testimony.

This is perfectly acceptable under every juris-

diction that has entertained the question.

Appellant fails,

however, to acknowledge that for every situation where hear36
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say evidence was allowed there was ample direct (non-hearsay)

evidence to establish total credibility.

The District Court

so found in its "Memorandum Opinion" (R 249-51).
Appellant's allegations concerning the type of testimony
received and particularly, that of Dr. Allen J. Concors is
nothing but a restatement of the arguments made in the lower
court (R 211).

Dr. Concors' testimony was not only signif-

icant as that of an expert witness in the area but also established the general feelings of the medical community as
a whole towards the practices of Appellant.

Dr. Concors

in his testimony did not admit he had a lack of knowledge
of expertise regarding chelation therapy but stated that he
had

ne~er

heard or read of it, indicating that the general

medical community as a whole does not allow this type of
therapy, even the respect of a theoretical basis.

It again

should be stated that the rule of Riley v. Layton, supra, allows the testimony of a medical expert in any similar community, thereby making general medical knowledge and practice
cosmopolitan in nature.

Appellant's allegation that nothing

in the record shows that Dr. Concors had any experience or
teaching to qualify him with knowledge or standards as "taught"
and as "it should be practiced in the State of Utah 11 was
clearly made in ignorance of this standard.
All of the physicians appearing on behalf of the Appellant were from California, none of whom had the qualifications,
background or training of Dr. Concors as an expert in the area.
It should be noted that Appellant's "expert," Dr. Halstead,
was on probation, his license to practice having been temporSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arily revoked for aiding and abetting an unlicensed individual
to practice medicine in the State of California.

Yet the

allegation of the Appellant that his three nondiscript, "eminently qualified physicians" who testified as npeers" of Dr.
Vance's as to methodology and treatments should be given
more deference than that to Dr. Allen Concors, who came to
the State of Utah from Florida where he was the head of a
hospital employing both M. D. 's and D. O. 's. , is a weak- attempt to say that the Committee had no business to decide
who it would believe.

such is an absurd and meaningless po-

sition.
The record of the hearing is replete

w~~h

incidents where

Appellant utilized methods and mechanisms totally foreign to
the practice of medical doctors or osteopaths and whose diagnostic abilities are founded upon questionable theory and not
scientific knowledge.

Any one of these incidents would be

sufficient fordisciplinary action.

Yet, taken as a whole/

and through the strength of testimony by witnesses presented
at the hearing, there is "no question" that the Committee
acted properly in protecting the public from one who had
proven himself unworthy of their trust.

The combined total

of Dr. Vance's actions left no choice but to revoke his
license and deny him the privilege of carrying on his unethical and unapproved practices any longer.
Perhaps the most potent admission of Dr. Vance that
he has had a history of improper actions is found in an
answer to a question by Mr. Halgren, counsel for the respondent.

The question and answer are as follows:
38
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Q.
[by Mr. Halgren] I see. Yo~ are
aware, are you, Dr. Vance, that there is
nothing wrong with a physician utilizing
a tool in this office for diagnostic purposes that may not be tested, provided he
fully informs his patient of the fact and does
not make any claim to his patient as to any
validity it may have if he is not assured of
its valid use, and as long as he doesn't make
a charge for the use of that machine as a
diagnostic tool?
A.
[by Dr. Vance] Well, this has been a
learning experience. And as I mentioned to the
Board earlier this morning, procedures have
changed in the last ten years, and I hope that
in the process I have cleaned up my act, so to
s~eak.
But I am aware now, Leon, of those particular things. (Emphasis added, T. 919.)
The facts established that Dr. Vance had not
up his act,

11

11

cleaned

but was, in fact, doing procedures and promis-

ing results that were not within the scope of legitimate and
accepted medical practice.

Not only had Dr. Vance had prob-

lems in the past, but he was still using questionable practices at the time charges were brought against him which
led to the revocation of his license.
Respondents now point out some of the many questionable practices:
(1)

various patients testified that Dr. Vance

used a procedure called Kirlian photography, which he described
in testimony as:
Coronogram is a permanent photograph recording of a phenomenon referred to as the
Kirlian phenomenon, K-I-R-L-I-A-N, which has
to do with what is theorized as energy radiating
from the human body. (T. 12)
(2)

various patients also testified to what Dr. Vance

described as an autogenous.vaccine, or urine vaccine.
(T.18, 19.)
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(3)

Dr. Vance would diagnose allergies by applying

pressure with his hand on the patient's hand while the
patient was thinking of different foods.

Judith Sevcik, a

perfrectly healthy individual who went to Dr. Vance for
Channel 2 T.V. testified as to this practice as follows:
[I] did hold out my hand and he would
apply pressure to it as he would call out
different foods. I remember wheat was one
that he said I should stay away from; milk,
refined foods.
Q. Did he tell you how he made that
determination based on this pressure?
A. I believe it was just my own body
reaction and what he felt coming through as
he applied the pressure.

Q. And then did he give you-a number of_
papers at that time showing what you should
or shouldn't eat?
A.
(T.

Yes, he did.

362-3.)
This same procedure was used as well with Ilene Waters

(T. 544-64) and Jan Stevens (T. 435-67}.

4.

Dr. Vance further treated Mrs. Sevcik for vitamin

deficiency by taking an image of a thumbprint.

She testified

in answer to questions:

Q. He didn't perform any tests of any
kind, any diagnostic tests using any machines
or instruments of any kind at that time?
A. Okay. He didn't, but his nurses
took an image of my thumbprint. And I'm not
sure what the instrument was called, but it
was to really tell what my energy level was.
And it transferred the image to a. negative.
I believe it was probably a polaroid negative. And the result was that I had very
low--a very low energy level.
40
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Q. Now after this thumbprint supposedly
showed a very low energy level, did Dr. Vance
make any comment to you or statement as to
what that indicated to him?
A. He mainly had indicated that I w~s .
lacking in vitamins and min~rals. ,AI;ld t~is is-at the time he set up a series of inJecti?ns-vi tarnins and mineral injections for me which
I went in and took these injections about every-maybe two to three weeks.

Q. Well, now was that diagnosis of low in
vitamins and minerals made at that time on the
basis of this thumbprint image?
A. I believe so; on the basis of the
thumbprint image and als what we had talked
about. (T. 361)
These procedures were only some of the many used by
Dr. Vance to treat and diagnose patients that came to him.
The re.cord contains many incidents where such procedures were
represented by Dr. Vance and paid for by the patient as
viable and acceptable medical treatments, but none of which
are accepted by the osteopathic or medical communities as
being medically sound.
Of importance to note is that Dr. Vance, through using
such inappropriate procedures diagnosed hypoglycemia in
healthy individuals on several occasions.

These individuals

are as follows (Respondent will not cite the pertinent
testimony, but will give a synopsis and refer the court to
the transcript where testimony is found):

Judy Sevcik was

sent by a local television station to Dr. Vance and even
took several treatments (T. 359-404); Milo Adams got sick
after treatments and went to a medical doctor and was checked
out as physically well (T .. 272-87); Lois Carter was treated
by Dr. Vance when she, in fact, had no medical problem (T.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41

251-70); Ilene Waters and Jan Stevens were checked by competent
medical doctors before going to Dr. Vance, at the request of
the Division, and were given clean "bills of health."

They

were diagnosed as having medical problems (T. 544-64 and T.
435-67, respectively).

These lax and unprofessional practices

accounting for such abuses of professional and medical judgment
cannot be sanctioned.
Further, Dr. Vance breached all professional ethics by
requiring, permitting, and forcing an unregistered employee
to perform intravenous injections.

Atha Moss, a £armer

employee, testified that Dr. Vance not only instructed her
to give "I V" injections, but threatened to fire her if she
refused (T. 341).

The California courts discussed this

exact issue in Kolnick v. Director, Bd. of Medical Quality,
161 Cal. Rptr. 259 ( 1980).

The court said:

"When the doctor

directs an unlicensed person to perform a medical. act, the
question is not whether the unlicensed person may be disciplined
for the act, but whether the doctor's conduct is, unprofessional
II

The use and sale of laetrile in Dr. Vance's office
referred to specifically (T.940), is clearly a breach of
professional ethics.
Allowing a patient to be removed from a hospital in
Wyoming and flown to Salt Lake City without consultation
with the patient's physicians (T. 941), and knowingly promising
to "save" the individual from what was diagnosed as Ewing's
Sarcoma, as testified by Mrs. Nickeson (T.29), and allowing
the callous treatment of Jim Nickeson, as stated by his
42
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mother's testimony (T. 27, 59), was clearly in violation of
professional ethics and in-and-of itself cause for the
recommendation of the Committee.

Even Dr. Vance reluctantly

admitted in dialogue and questioning from one of the Board,
:~

Dr. Katherine Greenwood, that it would be a good practice to

~~

contact a person's physician before becoming involved if the
patient was under the care of another (T. 942).
As stated as expert opinion on the record by Dr. Allen
Concors:
[I]t's not unusual for people who are in a
state of desperation or who have been labeled
with a terminal illness to seek extraordinary
regimes for some miraculous cure, for some
type of magical therapy, or some type of
magical drug that is going to cure them or
at least prolong their life and lessen
their agony.
But as we all know, reputable, genuinely
concerned physicians know better; and they don't
offer false hope when there is no hope; and
they don't use medical regimes that are
unsound and unproven. And to do that is, in
essence, to play on people's emotions and to
premeditatedly extort money from patients
when you know and you are trained better.
( T. 485. )

Another major unapproved and unprofessional procedure
Dr. Vance used to an extensive degree and which he has been
using through the stay pending the outcome of this appeal is
the use of a highly questionable and unproven procedure known
as chelation therapy.

In essence, a great majority of Dr.

Vance's patients would receive such treatments no matter
what was wrong with them (see testimony of the healthy people
that went to him for treatment), but would particularly be
used for the treatment of arteriosclerosis or atherosclerosis.
This,Sponsored
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is another violation of the ethical standards of an osteopathic
physician and surgeon, particularly where Dr. Vance has
represented that chelation therapy is a "miracle" treatment
for atherosclerosis.

The treatment is not a recognized and

accepted medical treatment for atherosclorosis and its
wholesale use for this purpose is rejected by members of the
medical field in general.
Appellant relied on the case of State Board of Medical
Examiners v. Rogers, 387 So.2d 937 (Md., 1980), for his use of
chelation therapy.

However, the Rodgers case is easily

distinguishable from the case at hand.

The court in that case

stated:
Dr. Rodgers allowed his patients to make
their own choice as to whether to begin this
treatment after full disclosure that this
methodology has not been proven effective
. . . that Dr. Rodgers never claimed it was
a cure and that there was no allegation or
proof of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, or
overreacting. (Emphasis added.)
This full disclosure never was given.
a patient that this methodology has

11

Dr. Vance never told
not been proven effective."

In fact, the record is exceedingly clear that Dr. Vance held
the procedure out as the "great miracle" of helping people.
When Mrs. Nickeson asked Dr. Vance how come the doctors in
Wyoming didn't know about this "miraculous procedure," all
Dr. Vance could say as related by Mrs. Nickeson:

"He told

me that his method of treatment was different and it was
new, and it was too bad that the Casper doctors didn't know
anything about it.

11

(Emphasis added, T. 30.)

The Rodgers decision, as restricted by the Supreme
44
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court of Florida has not been followed or cited in any
other jurisdiction, and stands not as effective precedent,
but as a singular and somewhat questionable interpretation
of the right to practice medicine.
The Rodgers full disclosure and disclaimer standard, as
stated by the Florida court, is clearly not applicable in
this matter as a defense for the chelation thereapy respresented
by Dr. Vance. The material and statements received by the patients in the Vance office did not contain such disclosures
and disclaimers.
A theory advance by the Rodgers case is that there is
some kind of inalienable right to practice medicine guaranteed
to the- populace.

This theory has long sine been put to rest

in the State of Utah.

In State of Utah v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d

602 (1976), the Supreme Court stated:

The public interest requiring the regulation
of healing arts and the Legislature undertaking
such regulation, it necessarily follo~i-s that
the profession of healing is no longer a right
under Section 58-1-1.1, but should properly
be labelled a "privilege" under Section
58-12-27.

In Hoffman, the Court also stated in support of the
Utah Medical Practice Act:
[T]he legislature is protecting t.he people
from the guac~s.who wo~ld dece~ve them into thinking
they are re<?eiving ~edical rel~ef whe.n. in reality,
they are being deprived of their money without the
remotest possibility of cure. This type of
c;ruac~ery also prevents people who may.be or are
in dire need of competent aid by their either
~elaying or foregoing of proper treatment. These
ill people think they are being cured,. when, in
fact, they are receiving no real help.
The case at hand is an example of the need for competent
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physicians to sit on the Osteopathic Committee, and to regulate
their own profession, and when necessary, remove from_practice
individuals who so grossly abuse the discretion allowed
physicians so as not to allow injury to patients, but the professio
as a whole.
Appellant cites nothing to show or even infer that a
wrong standard was followed.

Why?

dictated the correct decision.

Because the evidence

Clearly, ample direct

testimony sustained the decision.
POINT VI
THE DECISION OF THE OSTEOPATHIC
COMMITTEE WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED BY THIS COURT UNLESS IT IS-FOUND
TO BE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
Appellant's brief for more than 25 pages is nothing but
a verbatim transcription of Appellant's memoranda on appeal.
(See R. 212.)

It adds nothing to this appeal that was not

already adjudicated in the lower court. The Appellant has the
burden to establish that the decision was arbitrary, capricious
or based wholly on unsubstantiated facts before this Court
can act to overturn the decision.
decision must be sustained.

Absent such a showing the

The established standard by

which the Court shall judge the Committee's findings is that
the Appellant must prove that the recommendation and the
action of the Director was totally without basis in fact or
that said actions were arbitrary and capricious in nature.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Petty v.
Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (1979), stated:
[I]t is appropriate to affirm our commitment
to these general propositions; that an adminis46
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trative agency should be allowed a com~ari~ively
wide latitude of discussion in performing its
responsibilities; and that ~he Court should not
intrude or interfere therewith unless the action
is so oppressive or unreasonable that it must
be deemed capricious and arbitrary or that the
agency has in some way acted c9ntrary to th~
law or in excess of its authority. (Emphasis
added.)
This standard of review is regionally accepted and, is
found in virtually every jurisdiction.

Those in Utah's area

that accept it are Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Nevada,
California and Wyoming.
The terms arbitrary and capricious as used in the
above-stated discussions have been qualified as "[W)ilfull
and unreasonable actions without consideration and in disregard
of the facts or circumstances and then but wherethere is
room for two opinions action is not arbitrary and capriicious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration."
A review of the record will convince the Court that in fact,
the Osteopathic Committee did employ the correct standard in
the review of the evidence and that their findings were
correct.

The District Court stated in its decision (R. 250)

that the Committee "[W]as unusually cautious in its findings
the record suggests that the Committee was conservative in
its findings rather than otherwise and those findings entirely
support the recommended order entered by the director."
(Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the Court below read the entire
transcript numbering 1,189 pages, examined all the exhibits
and extensive memoranda filed by both parties.

(R 249-51.)

The finding of the Court below was reflective of a complete
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and thorough review of the action before the administrative
body.

The attempt by Appellant, at this point of the appeal

process, to present a cursory and twisted set of excerpts
from that voluminous transcript is nothing more than an
attempt to cloud the real facts.

The "complete" picture can

only be seen after a complete review of the transcript as
was made by the Appellate Court.

As stated in Petty, supra,

this court would have to find that the actions of the Committee
were capricious and arbitrary or that the agency has in some
way acted contrary to law or in excess of its authority.
Appeallant has not pointed out where this is found.
Osteopathic Committee took the matter into

qa~eful

The
consideration

and found from an exhaustive review of the evidence that
Appellant was in fact guilty of unprofessional conduct and
should have his license revoked.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is not entitled to an "Appeal De Novo. 11

The

issues raised in his brief have been argued and decided by
the Appellate Court.

This Court should not review "anew"

those decisions.
The Osteopathic Committee of the State of Utah was the
"appropriate tribunal" to review the evidence against Appellant.
The appointment of Dr. Greenwood to sit on the Committee was
made by Paul T. Fordham, Director of the Division of Registraion.
Through inadvertance on his part, the residency requirements
were not checked.

She was sworn in and acted in a highly

professional manner.

No objection has ever been raised as

to her competence to sit on "peer review".
48
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Dr. Greenwood acted under color of authority ude facto 11
and thus the decision (which had little or no relationship
to residency anyway) must be upheld.
Appellant filed his appeal under Utah Code Ann. §58-12-35.1(..5)
and not under Utah Code Ann. §58-1-36.

Counsel is confused.

There is no "de novo" provided.
The Committee is the proper body to determine whether specific
acts fall under the definition of "unprofessional conduct"
as alleged and defined by the statute.

No independent regu-

lations listing the myriads of possibilties are necessary.
Appellant had a proper hearing.
of

du~

process in any shape or form.

There was no denial
Neither the Committee

nor the Appellate (District) Court abused its discretion
or acted arbitrarily.

Certainly the evidence sustains the

decision of the Committee.
· THEREFORE, Respondents strongly urge this Court to sustain the decision of the Appellate Court upholding the revocation of Appellant's licenses and immediately lifting the
stay of said Order that Appellant has been continuing under-This for the health and safety of the public.
DATED this

/~day

of April, 1982.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney(;ene-ra"l-~
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